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 Perelman’s Th eory of Argumentation 
and Natural Law 
 Francis J. Mootz  III 
 Chaïm Perelman resuscitated the rhetorical tradition by developing an 
elegant and detailed theory of argumentation. Rejecting the single-minded 
Cartesian focus on rational truth, Perelman recovered the ancient wisdom 
that we can argue reasonably about matters that admit only of probabil-
ity. From this one would conclude that Perelman’s argumentation theory 
is inalterably opposed to natural law, and therefore that I would have done 
better to have written an article titled “Perelman’s Th eory of Argumentation 
 as a Rejection of Natural Law.” 
 However, my thesis is precisely that Perelman’s theory of argumen-
tation connects to the natural law tradition in interesting and produc-
tive ways. Perelman referred to natural law in a number of his essays as 
an example of the excessively rational focus that he sought to correct 
with his theory of argumentation, but he also noted the power of natural 
law claims in legal argumentation. To my knowledge, he never off ered 
a detailed account of the connections between his theory of argumen-
tation and natural law. However, Perelman’s deep and abiding concern 
with justice suggests that he could not help but be interested in lines of 
argumentation that challenge positive laws from some other standpoint—
that, in some manner, he must embrace some elements of the natural law 
tradition. 
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 I wish to outline the ways that a natural law account can fi t with 
 Perelman’s theory of argumentation in order to address an ontological crisis 
that grips contemporary legal theory. Steven Smith (2004) has persuasively 
described “law’s quandary” now that legal practice purports to be divorced 
from the natural law contexts in which it developed. Smith provocatively 
contends that there is “at least a strong  prima facie case that modern legal 
discourse is operating in a sort of ‘ontological gap’ that divides our explicit 
or owned ontological commitments (which preclude us from  recognizing 
the reality of ‘the law’ [that stands distinct from empirical legal practices]) 
from the ontological assumptions not only implicit in but essential to 
our discourse and practice (which seem to presuppose the reality of ‘the 
law’)” (1994, 63).  1  In a similar vein, Peter Goodrich describes the plight of 
contemporary legal theory with concise accuracy, observing that we have 
abandoned natural law foundations originally constructed in ecclesiastical 
venues only to fi nd that the project of developing a secular legal language 
capable of transforming the management of social confl ict into questions 
of technical rationality is doomed to failure (1996, 160–61). 
 I contend that by working through a conception of natural law that fi ts 
with Perelman’s philosophy of argumentation we can fi nd a promising way 
to address law’s ontological crisis. Th e philosophy of the new rhetoric is a 
rich resource for describing the ontological space in which law operates and 
also for providing normative guidance to those engaged in legal practice. 
 the natural law tradition 
 Th e term “natural law” generally calls to mind a philosophical account 
that bloomed in ancient Rome, was absorbed into the Christian tradition, 
reached full expression in Aquinas, and then was secularized and rational-
ized as a philosophy of natural rights. Cicero off ered a succinct defi nition of 
pre-Christian natural law based on the Stoic tradition, arguing that natural 
law is universal, eternal, and unchanging and that these characteristics of 
reality follow from the fact that natural law is authored and administered 
by a deity. 
 True law is right reason in agreement with Nature; it is of universal 
application, unchanging and everlasting. . . . [W]e need not look 
outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there 
will not be diff erent laws at Rome and at Athens, or diff erent laws 
now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will 
PR 43.4_05.indd   384 10/20/10   1:44:38 AM
perelman’s theory of argumentation and natural law
385
be valid for all nations and for all times, and there will be one 
 master and one ruler, that is, God, over us all, for He is the author 
of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. (1928, 3.22.33) 
 Cicero’s account was easily accommodated to Christian principles that were 
embraced and propagated by the Roman Empire. Centuries later, Aquinas 
diff erentiated eternal law, natural law and positive law, arguing that God’s 
divine will is beyond our ken but that we are capable of determining the 
conditions under which humans fl ourish through use of our reason because, 
to borrow St. Paul’s words, the natural law has been written in our hearts.  2  
 Following centuries of war and violence waged on behalf of religious 
belief, Enlightenment scholars sought to ground the persistent demand for 
human rights in univocal reason rather than a religious cosmology. In this 
account, human nature gives rise to certain moral precepts rather than a 
lawgiving deity; more precisely, the integrity and intrinsic worth of human 
life gives rise to a variety of moral dictates. Th is shift in emphasis is noted in 
the term “natural rights,” which a person bears, as opposed to “natural law,” 
to which a person is subject. 
 Most recently, Germain Grisez, John Finnis, and Robert P. George 
have argued for a “new natural law” that purports to rejuvenate Aquinas’s 
approach in terms that are suitable to our secular and rationalist age. Put 
simply, they contend that a number of incommensurable human goods 
simply are given as elements of human fl ourishing and that these human 
goods provide a determinate basis for ethical decision making through the 
exercise of a noncalculative and nonutilitarian practical reasoning. 
 Th eories of natural law refl ect critical accounts of the constitutive 
aspects of the well-being and fulfi llment of human persons and the com-
munities they form. Th e propositions that pick out fundamental aspects of 
human fl ourishing are directive (that is, prescriptive) in our thinking about 
what to do and what to refrain from doing (our practical reason)—that is, 
they are, or provide, more than merely instrumental reasons for action and 
self-restraint (George 2007, 55; Finnis 2005). 
 George emphasizes the chastened character of the “new natural law” by 
rejecting the idea that judges may directly access its principles in deciding 
cases; rather, positive law always imperfectly implements natural law, and 
therefore a commitment to the rule of law is a critical feature of modern 
constitutional democracies (2007, 71–75). 
 Th is long-standing, but constantly evolving, tradition of natural law 
thinking does not easily connect with Perelman’s theory of  argumentation 
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for the simple reason that genuine argumentation plays no role in the 
 existence or elaboration of this tradition. Th e positing of an abiding crite-
rion that exists outside of time or place leaves no room for argumentation; 
instead, there is simply validity or nonvalidity. Even the “new natural law” is 
at odds with Perelman’s philosophy because it presumes that there are cor-
rect answers to moral questions—even though people acting in good faith 
can disagree about which answer is correct—and also insists that reaching 
the correct answer is a matter of refi ning our abilities to reason practically. 
For example, Anthony Lisska accuses Finnis’s “new natural law” of pro-
moting the exercise of theoretical reason in the guise of practical reason 
(1996, 156). As I explain, Lisska’s reconstruction of Aquinas’s philosophy 
in terms of Aristotelian practical reasoning provides a plausible theoretical 
starting point for conceiving natural law in terms of Perelman’s theory of 
argumentation. 
 Given its historical trajectory, it should come as no surprise that 
 Perelman roundly criticizes natural law. He rejects the secular, rationalist 
incarnation of the tradition because it presumes that reason can determine 
not only what is true in the world of empirical fact but also what is just in the 
social world (1980, 29–32, 42–44, 131). His friend and colleague  Mieczyslaw 
Maneli argues that the new rhetoric rejects any traditionalist reliance on a 
“natural” state of aff airs (1986, 361–62). As Perelman notes, the traditional 
approach to natural law continually runs aground on the shoals of experi-
ence, as demonstrated by the fact that reason has failed to settle debates 
regarding justice that reach back at least as far as Sophocles (1980, 165).  3  
He concludes that justice is not univocal; instead, it always requires making 
choices between justifi able tenets that are in confl ict. Law must operate in 
the realm of the reasonable as well as the rational if it is to do justice. 
 However, Perelman’s philosophy also is deeply indebted to  Aristotle, 
and Perelman recognizes that there may be room for a very  diff erent under-
standing of natural law by drawing on Aristotle. In a  dictionary entry on 
the term, Perelman cautions that combining two polysemic words such 
as “nature” and “law” yields myriad defi nitions, and so one must think 
 contextually and historically rather than conceptually (Foriers and  Perelman 
1974, 13–14). Aristotle off ers a counterpoint to modern rationalist concep-
tions of natural law because he was too wedded to the necessity of an equi-
table leavening of the law to endorse a thoroughly rationalized approach to 
legal practice. In response to a question at a seminar, Perelman criticized 
the alignment of natural law with the “rational”—regarded in terms of the 
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mathematical model of moral reasoning—but he emphasized that there 
was a line of thinking from Aristotle to Aquinas that embraced a more 
fl exible account. “I don’t see either Aristotle or Th omas Aquinas saying as 
Grotius says, that there are eternal laws of justice, just as eternal as the laws 
of mathematics. It is impossible” (1979a, 221). As Jan Broekman summarizes, 
“Natural law and positive law are both historical and subject to change. It 
is precisely this dimension that defi nes the inquiry of Perelman” (1986, 383). 
Th is gesture by Perelman toward the classical understanding of natural law 
as a feature of the interplay between the hypothesized rational legal system 
and the reasonable resolution of specifi c cases provides the starting point 
for my inquiry. 
 I use the term “natural law” generally to refer to the tradition of natural 
law thinking, but in this article I propose a new understanding of natural 
law. Th e term “natural law” combines two elements: nature and law. I argue 
that the “nature” under consideration is human nature—more specifi cally, 
our nature as fi nite, hermeneutical, and rhetorical beings. Th e “law” to 
which I refer is not given in the natural world nor promulgated by a deity; 
rather, it is the social activity of legal regulation. I conclude that “natural 
law” is best understood as a “naturalized rhetoric,” by which I mean that 
the manner in which we engage in legal regulation is rooted in our inter-
pretive and rhetorical nature. Defi ned in this manner, natural law fi ts with 
Perelman’s theory of argumentation, although it is necessary to draw these 
connections very carefully. 
 perelman’s theory of argumentation and natural law 
 Th ere are at least three diff erent ways to think about natural law in conjunc-
tion with Perelman’s theory of argumentation. First, we can regard natural 
law as a line of argument, a related family of commonplaces that we fi nd 
impossible to ignore, despite our overt positivist commitments.  Second, 
we might connect Perelman’s contested (and often misunderstood) idea of 
a “universal audience” to the natural law tradition. Finally, and most radi-
cally, we might think of natural law in more far-reaching theoretical terms 
by conceiving Perelman’s philosophy as propounding a “naturalized rheto-
ric.” By connecting with the natural law tradition in these multiple ways, 
 Perelman’s theory of argumentation demonstrates robust affi  nities with 
natural law. In this short article I can only adumbrate these three lines 
of inquiry. 
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 Natural Law as a Commonplace 
 Perelman recognized that natural law plays an important role in legal 
 argumentation, even if we reject the claim that there is an objective struc-
ture of justice that can be understood through the use of reason:
 Th e idea of natural law is also misconceived when it is posed in 
ontological terms. . . . Natural law is better considered as a body of 
general principles or loci, consisting of ideas such as “the nature of 
things,” “the rule of law,” and of rules such as “No one is expected 
to perform impossibilities,” “both sides should be heard”—all of 
which are capable of being applied in diff erent ways. It is the task 
of the legislator or judge to decide which of the not unreasonable 
solutions should become a rule of positive law. Such a view, accord-
ing to Michel Villey, corresponds to the idea of natural law found 
in Aristotle and St. Th omas Aquinas—what he calls the classical 
natural law. (1979b, 33–34) 
 Th e dialectic of the reasonable and the rational in law shows the need for 
a more fl exible understanding of natural law as something other than a 
 rational construct that is timeless and universal (Perelman 1979b, 120–22). 
 Perelman’s analysis of the natural law tradition as a collection of com-
monplaces exemplifi es how rhetorical exchanges working from common-
places contain a critical bite. He cites the decision by the Allies to justify 
the Nuremberg trials with appeals to natural law as a concession to the fact 
that the demands of justice exceed the capacity of positive law (1979b, 104). 
Even if the history of natural law thought is marked by authoritarian and 
ideological overtones, Perelman does not regard the tradition as a “mistake” 
that should—or can—be exorcized from our vocabulary. He eff ectively strips 
natural law precepts of their inauthentic claims to eternal and universal 
validity and urges legal theorists and practitioners to utilize the principles 
as vital (indeed, unavoidable) resources for introducing innovation and for 
critiquing existing legal relations. 
 Perelman’s approach recalls Aristotle’s advice about how to argue 
against application of a written law that is against one’s interest when it 
is read literally rather than in an eff ort to eff ectuate the purpose of the 
law. In the  Rhetoric , Aristotle recommends arguing that following the writ-
ten law slavishly would do an injustice, quoting Antigone’s pleas as a basis 
for this line of argument. He suggests one should argue this point fi rst by 
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observing that “it is evident that if the written law is contrary to the facts, 
one must use common law and arguments based on fairness as being more 
just.” Next, he says, one should point out that “to use ‘best understanding’ is 
not to follow the written law exclusively” and “that fairness always remains 
and never changes nor does the common law (for it is in accordance with 
nature) but written laws often change” (1991, 110). Aristotle emphasizes that 
the advocate should argue that not all written laws are just, and so the per-
son seeking justice should conform to the unwritten law (1991, 66–74). 
 Tony Burns (2002) explains why Aristotle includes this line of argu-
mentation in the  Rhetoric . First, Burns argues that Aristotle miscasts 
Sophocles as a defender of a universal and eternal natural law. It is more 
likely that Antigone is appealing to tradition-bound and parochial religious 
custom rather than invoking abstract and eternal principles. In other words, 
Antigone invokes a premodern natural law argument that too often is lost 
in our rationalist readings of Aristotle, providing additional support for the 
idea that the “natural law” is a confused concept that has been invoked as 
part of arguments within diff ering contexts over the millennia. 
 More important, Burns contends that Aristotle did not endorse this 
line of argument, although by including it in the  Rhetoric he acknowledged 
that these types of argument—most vividly advanced by sophistic chal-
lenges to slavery as an “unnatural” practice—had found currency among his 
contemporaries (2003, 28–35).  4  To the extent that Aristotle eventually did 
endorse natural law arguments, Burns contends that he did so in order to 
 justify the status quo against radical attacks (2003, 34–35). Burns explains:
 Aristotle’s treatment of the concept of natural justice or law . . . in 
the  Nicomachean Ethics , in striking contrast to what he says about 
natural law arguments in the  Rhetoric , might be seen as a classic 
illustration of such a rhetorical manoeuvre. Th e irony of  Aristotle’s 
suggestion that it is his radical political opponents such as Alcidimas 
who employ the concept of natural law in a merely rhetorical man-
ner whereas he himself employs the same concept in the pursuit 
of objective ethical truth is readily apparent—especially (but not 
only) to those of a Nietzschean or poststructuralist philosophical 
persuasion. (2003, 35) 
 Natural law has a complex valence in Aristotle’s usage, but Perelman 
would certainly conclude that these diff erent uses of natural law by 
Aristotle follow from the fact that it is an essentially contested concept 
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that is closely connected to justice. If natural law is an ontological feature 
of the world, it must be the case that when both parties in a debate invoke 
natural law one of them must be wrong. However, when natural law is 
understood as a commonplace from which one may argue many points 
in diff erent ways, one must regard it as a supple and polysemic concept 
that does not yield singular answers to social and legal disputes. Even the 
highly rationalistic notions of natural rights that arose in the Enlighten-
ment period can be viewed as lines of critical argumentation against the 
status quo that proved to be incredibly productive rhetorical strategies even 
though they lacked the certainty an ontological backing could provide. As 
Michel Foucault reminds us, critique might be seen as “the art of not being 
governed quite so much,” and he highlights the historical emergence of 
natural law arguments in favor of human rights as one of three historical 
points in the emergence of critique as an element of the Enlightenment 
(2007, 45). Natural law can be seen as an ideological commitment to the 
status quo or as liberating critique, which is precisely its importance as a 
line of argumentation. 
 Lawyers encounter examples of the polysemic character of common-
places on a daily basis; this is the source of the energy and innovation of 
legal argumentation. Consider the issues raised by the collection of policies 
and practices known collectively as “affi  rmative action.” Th e law is quite 
clear that states may not deny to any citizen equal protection under the 
law. But what does this commonplace mean in the context of determining 
which employees will be promoted in a certain workplace? Does equality 
mean subjecting every employee to the exact same testing criteria, or does 
it mean assessing the merits of each individual employee to perform the job 
functions while also attending to the eff ects of past discrimination on cer-
tain employees’ ability to compete according to supposed neutral criteria? 
It is a curious, but not altogether uncommon, feature of legal practice that 
opposing sides in a contentious legal dispute can appeal to the same legal 
principles and rules in support of their respective positions. Th ese localized 
doctrinal disputes refl ect the same dynamic that has been at work in the use 
of natural law arguments since the dawn of Western civilization. 
 Natural Law as the Construction of a Universal Legal Audience 
 Perelman’s development of the ancient attention to audience is one of his 
signature contributions to rhetorical theory. Noting that the audience envi-
sioned by the speaker “is always a more or less systematized construction,” 
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Perelman places emphasis on the speaker’s goal of creating her audience 
in the course of addressing it (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 19). 
In some circumstances, a speaker will aspire to more than persuading the 
audience to which the speech is immediately directed and will claim to 
off er reasons that would be convincing to all reasonable persons. “Th is 
refers of course, in this case, not to an experimentally proven fact, but to a 
universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker, to the agreement of 
an audience which should be universal, since, for legitimate reasons, we 
need not take into consideration those [who] are not part of it” (Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 31). Speakers construct a universal audience 
not only to shape their discourse but also to entreat the concrete audience 
before them—which “can never amount to more than fl oating incarnations 
of this universal audience” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 31)—to 
imagine themselves as part of such an audience. As Perelman emphasizes, 
the actual audience helps to validate the speaker’s construction of the uni-
versal audience, even as the universal audience serves as a check on the 
parochial concerns of the actual audience (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
1969, 35). 
 All lines of argumentation are shaped to the audience to which they 
are addressed, and natural law arguments are no diff erent. I believe that it 
makes good sense to regard natural law arguments as addressing a particu-
lar audience in their capacity as a contingent example of a hypothesized 
universal audience. When some sophists argued that slavery was an aff ront 
to the natural dignity and equality of all men they appealed to a specifi c 
Greek audience rooted in customary practices of slavery, but they sought to 
provoke this audience to recognize its membership in a broader universal 
audience. Arguing that slavery is a violation of universal norms that are part 
of the structure of reality does not call for an investigation of the natural 
world; rather, it calls for a reconfi guration of the self-understanding of the 
audience. 
 As a lawyer and law professor, I have no doubt that natural law argu-
ments (even if not expressly characterized as such) are ubiquitous and per-
haps unavoidable in legal practice. If we agree with Perelman that there is 
no abiding structure of reality that grounds these arguments ontologically, 
we must seek to understand them by exploring the character of the audi-
ence that the legal orator seeks to construct and the manner by which the 
orator seeks to motivate an actual audience to act in response to them. 
I regard it as impossible to carry out this task without employing a con-
ception of the universal audience, which suggests that the notion of the 
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 universal audience is critical to Perelman’s philosophical clarifi cation of 
legal argumentation, a practice that he regarded as exemplary for moral 
argumentation (1980, 114–19, 146, 174). Th is leads me to conclude that the 
idea of natural law claims as commonplaces that seek resonance with an 
audience inspired to reconstitute itself as the universal audience resides at 
the center of Perelman’s theory of argumentation and is not just an obscure 
detail in Perelman scholarship. 
 By exploring natural law arguments made within the context of the 
legal system we can avoid some of the many misunderstandings that have 
arisen from Perelman’s use of the term “universal audience” to refer to a 
hypothesized audience of all reasonable persons to whom a philosophical 
claim to truth is addressed. A natural law argument is directed to a universal 
audience for whom the actual audience—whether a jury, judge, or appel-
late panel—serves as a stand-in. But this is not to say that the audience is 
hypothesized to be generically “rational” or “philosophical.” Claims in this 
setting are peculiarly legal in nature and are best paraphrased as “No rea-
sonable person seeking to implement the values of our legal system could 
conclude that slavery is legitimate, notwithstanding our custom and written 
laws to the contrary.” Arguments traditionally couched in natural law terms 
are not arguments made to a timeless and decontextualized rational being; 
rather, these arguments are designed to provoke the actual audience to rise 
above their parochial interests and to conceive of themselves as empowered 
to articulate truth, justice, and other confused notions in a manner that all 
members of the community should fi nd persuasive. Using the terminology 
of contemporary rhetorical criticism, we can say that natural law arguments 
address a particular audience of intended readers with the goal of invoking 
an idealized (universal) audience (see Selzer 1992). 
 Trial lawyers emphasize the importance of developing a “theory of the 
case,” which is to say that they try to construct a narrative that the jury 
will endorse as its own recounting of what happened and what should be 
done. Th e “theory of the case” is in fact a factual narrative rather than a 
theoretical construct. Th e goal is to persuade the jury that justice demands 
a verdict in favor of one’s client; literally, the facts are presented so that 
they appear to speak for themselves. Perhaps the most famous, and most 
mimicked, theory of the case was off ered by veteran trial lawyer Johnnie 
Cochran in his defense of O. J. Simpson for the murder of his ex-wife 
and her companion. Although the rhyming cadence of “If it doesn’t fi t, 
you must acquit” provoked laughs when repeated by late-night comedians, 
Cochran employed a powerful rhetorical device to summon the jury to 
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assume its role as the guarantors of justice. Th e evidence against  Simpson 
was  powerful and comprehensive, and yet the prosecution’s case was fi lled 
with various holes, inconsistencies, and gaff es. Cochran’s theory of the case 
was simple: despite overwhelming forensic evidence, the government’s 
actions and representations evidenced a malicious, or at least incompe-
tent, approach to the  prosecution that should not be tolerated by a jury 
empaneled to do justice. 
 We can see in the everyday practice of trial lawyers the rhetorical call for 
a specifi c audience to act as a universal audience. Th e entire trial process is 
suff used with procedural elements that permit the competing rhetors—the 
opposed lawyers—to construct the audience they will address in the closing 
argument. From jury selection, to the narrative drama of the presentation 
of the evidence, to the formulation of jury charges, and through the closing 
arguments, the trial is a sustained eff ort to construct the jury in such a way 
that it assumes its role as an incarnation of the universal audience that rises 
above the immediacy of the individual concerns of the jurors. In  A Th eory 
of the Trial , Robert Burns argues that a trial structures competing linguistic 
practices and performances to enable the trier to make practical judgments 
about what is to be done in response to complex and competing accounts 
of facts and norms (1999). Th is leads Burns to characterize judgment as 
the “strife” of competing claims to truth (1999, 181–82). Th e advocates call 
on the jury to act as a universal audience capable of working through this 
unavoidable strife in reasonable fashion. 
 Th e jury responds to the competing narratives fi rst by determining the 
important issues at stake and then by resolving them in a practical man-
ner that reaffi  rms the integrity of both general principles and the specifi c 
factual circumstances. Burns concludes:
 I have argued that a great advantage of the contemporary trial 
is its internal complexity, comprising empirical, moral, political, 
and strictly “legal” language and values. It is suffi  ciently fl exible 
to allow, indeed to require, that the jury determine what the most 
important aspect of the case is. . . . 
 . . . Th e trial’s constitutive rules and practices allow for  delicate 
choices about the inevitable metalevel questions woven into the tri-
al’s diff erent linguistic practices. If these incommensurable spheres 
exhaust our social perspectives, if there is no Platonic perspective 
from which one might determine which sphere is ultimately dom-
inant, from which (partial) perspective ought the jury to decide 
PR 43.4_05.indd   393 10/20/10   1:44:38 AM
francis j. mootz iii
394
which perspective is the right one? Th e answer seems to me clear. 
Th e jury decides the metalevel questions from the perspective of 
commonsense morality, rigorously applied, criticized, and some-
times challenged by the devices of the trial. Th e existence of such a 
forum is a challenge to any form of social ordering that cannot jus-
tify its distinctive principles in the language of ordinary morality. 
(1999, 239, 244) 
 Th e theory of the case, the artful construction of past factual events during 
the trial, is more than a base appeal to individual jurors to display their mor-
alistic biases. Th e jurors are challenged to act in concert, after deliberation, 
to repair a breach of social ties. Sitting in judgment over the strife of incom-
mensurable claims, they collectively act as a transitory incarnation of the 
universal audience. 
 Naturalizing Rhetoric 
 Th ere is a fi nal, and more radical, sense in which we can connect natural law 
with Perelman’s theory of argumentation. I term this approach, “naturaliz-
ing rhetoric.” Th is is a potentially misleading term, and so I want to unpack 
my meaning carefully. As used in contemporary philosophical discourse, 
“naturalism” refers generally to a philosophy that sees itself as clarifying the 
empirical dimensions of reality rather than engaging in speculative meta-
physics. Th e assumption is that nature is just empirical reality, subject to 
scientifi c investigation as supplemented by philosophical refl ection. I use 
the term “naturalized rhetoric” as a provocation to challenge this prejudice: 
we “naturalize” rhetoric when we regard human “nature” as a deeply rhetori-
cal condition. Simply put, it is our persistent human condition to continu-
ously recreate ourselves and our society through rhetorical exchanges with 
others. A naturalized rhetoric embraces the paradox that nonessentialism 
is essential to our being, that we can fi nd a foundation for refl ection in 
antifoundationalism.  5  
 A naturalized rhetoric has both explanatory and normative force. On 
the one hand, a naturalized rhetoric underwrites Perelman’s theory of argu-
mentation by emphasizing that it is an affi  rmative account of our nature 
as reasoning beings rather than a reluctant concession to the limitations of 
our rational capacity. Perelman is less vigorous in his critique of Cartesian 
rationalism than Vico, who argued against the incipient rationalism of the 
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Western tradition by defending the priority of rhetoric and its  connections 
to our imaginative capacities and the metaphoric structure of human 
understanding (Mootz 2008b; Mootz 2009). By naturalizing rhetoric in the 
humanist tradition exemplifi ed by Vico we can elaborate the ontological 
claims that subtend Perelman’s theory of argumentation. 
 Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics performs the nec-
essary task of providing an ontological grounding of Perelman’s rhetorical 
philosophy in a manner that connects with Vico’s more radical rhetorical 
insights. Th e centerpiece of Gadamer’s account of the nature of human 
understanding is the metaphor of a conversation that yields an ongoing—
which is to say a never completed—fusion of horizons. If our nature is deeply 
hermeneutical, it is also deeply rhetorical. We engage others rhetorically; 
we experience this engagement hermeneutically. Gadamer provides guid-
ance in the face of “Cartesian anxiety” by providing an ontological account 
of the social nature of understanding (Bineham 1995). Perelman’s descrip-
tion of rhetorical moves can be misinterpreted as a relativistic response 
to the Cartesian model of knowledge, but Gadamer’s ontological account 
grounds Perelman’s rhetorical philosophy in a way that prevents this mis-
reading (Mootz 2006, 30–32). In other words, Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics ensures that we appreciate Perelman’s work as a description 
of the human condition, not as a handbook of argumentative strategies. 
 Important normative implications follow from a naturalized rhetoric. 
If it is our nature to be rhetorical, an ethical system oriented toward pro-
moting human fl ourishing would require that we ensure the social and legal 
context for the development of this capacity. Th is recognition would not 
lead to specifi c policy prescriptions nor provide defi nitive answers to spe-
cifi c legal dilemmas, but it would generally point us in the direction of 
maximizing human communication and exchange. Moreover, a naturalized 
rhetoric suggests a basis from which we might approach one of the central 
questions in rhetorical theory—whether there is a basis for distinguishing 
“good” rhetoric from “bad” rhetoric—in a more productive manner. 
 Jeff rey Maciejewski (2005, 2006) makes just this claim by connecting 
the basic good of social life to the natural fact that rhetoric is necessary to 
fashion a community. Although overly wedded to nonrhetorical features 
of Aquinas’s natural law philosophy, Maciejewski aligns himself with the 
notion of an evolving human nature that is rhetorically secured in social 
intercourse. He properly concludes that there is a natural rhetoric essential 
to the development of the person. 
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 When examined more acutely using a moral theory attuned to 
human behavior such as natural law, it seems that declaring per-
suasion immoral as a violation of autonomy belies the human 
penchant for employing rhetoric as part of living in society. As 
rhetoric services reason, which in turn services the dispositions, it 
can be seen as a natural, morally praiseworthy concomitant of the 
exercising of reason which helps to reveal the potentiality of reason 
itself. Moreover, I believe it possible to refer to such rhetoric as 
“natural.” (2005, 256) 
 However, when exploring these themes it is crucial to avoid the tempta-
tion to essentialize our rhetorical nature by supposing that it includes more 
substantive agreement on shared norms than can be secured in dialogue 
and argumentation. In other words, it is always illegitimate to recognize 
our rhetorical nature but then to prescribe certain “natural law” claims that 
 must be accepted by all rational persons and that therefore can be  coercively 
imposed . 
 Perelman’s cautions about the dangers of invoking the universal audi-
ence speak to these potential abuses of natural law claims. Perelman warns 
of the danger of elitism that results in characterizing dissenters as irrational 
or heretics or that leads the speaker to constrict the actual audience to a 
small vanguard that already agrees with the claims put forward (Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 33–34). Th ese ideological tendencies are closely 
associated with natural law argumentation through the ages, but it is pre-
cisely by naturalizing rhetoric that we have the best chance of avoiding this 
misuse of natural law commonplaces. By recognizing that it is our nature to 
be rhetorical, and that the variety of legal systems rest on this naturalized 
rhetoric rather than on an objective state of aff airs that can be discerned by 
reason alone, we can understand how natural law argumentation works to 
construct a universal audience through rhetorical means. 
 I am not writing on a completely blank slate in legal theory to suggest 
this reading of the natural law tradition. Even the resolute analytical legal 
positivist, H. L. A. Hart, concedes that it made sense to acknowledge that 
there is a minimal natural law requirement that shapes a legal system in 
light of our human nature and the bare need for survival (1994, 193–200). 
Hart argues that the nature of human existence—our vulnerability to each 
other, our approximate equality in endowments, and our not being either 
wholly altruistic or evil—provides the context in which certain sociole-
gal conditions must be present to permit survival. Hart suggests that this 
recognition shows a way to do justice to both the natural law and positive 
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law traditions: “We shall no longer have to choose between two unsuitable 
alternatives which are often taken as exhaustive: on the one hand, that of 
saying that this is required by ‘the’ meaning of the words ‘law’ or ‘legal 
system,’ and on the other, that of saying that it is ‘just a fact’ that most legal 
systems do provide for sanctions” (1994, 199). 
 Rather than debating whether sanctions are an essential feature of the 
concept of legality, Hart suggests that we are better served by regarding 
them as a “natural necessity” in light of the human condition. Needless to 
say, this concession has sparked spirited debate.  6  
 Th ere are several productive points of reference in recent legal theory 
that develop alternative accounts of natural law in a manner congenial to 
my thesis. In contrast to Hart’s minimal concession, Lon Fuller argued that 
moral commitments generated in communicative exchange extend beyond, 
and sometimes override, the biologically driven struggle to survive (1969, 
184–86). In his fi nal response to the criticisms of his proceduralist approach 
to natural law, Fuller revealed that he was a genuine natural law theorist. 
Elsewhere I have argued that these brief and overlooked remarks reveal 
that Fuller is best understood as a proponent of the style of natural law 
that resonates with Perelman’s rhetorical philosophy (1999, 338–45). Fuller’s 
dramatic fi nal plea on behalf of natural law calls for what I have termed a 
naturalized rhetoric: “If I were asked, then, to discern one central indis-
putable principle of what may be called substantive natural law—Natural 
Law with capital letters—I would fi nd it in the injunction: Open up, main-
tain, and preserve the integrity of the channels of communication by which 
men convey to one another what they perceive, feel, and desire” (1969, 186). 
More recently, Lloyd Weinreb (1987, 1994) has moved beyond Fuller’s tenta-
tive suggestion and argued in favor of natural law understood as the eff ort 
to work out the normative  kosmos in which we fi nd ourselves as creative 
participants. 
 Th e work by Fuller and Weinreb provides excellent starting points 
in legal theory for understanding the concept of a naturalized rhetoric as 
a productive development of the natural law tradition. Fuller paid scant 
attention to these dimensions of his work, providing only a gesture at the 
end of his career toward this type of analysis. Weinreb has more thoroughly 
embraced  nomos as the ground of natural law, thereby bringing himself 
within the rhetorical tradition defended by Vico and revived by Perelman. 
However, Weinreb’s approach is on the fringe of American jurispruden-
tial writing; his singular voice has not resonated in a positivist era during 
which the natural law tradition has waned into virtual irrelevance. Reading 
Perelman’s philosophy as a naturalized rhetoric provides vital context and 
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backing for Weinreb’s work, permitting more detailed elaborations of the 
hermeneutical-rhetorical character of legal practice. 
 conclusion 
 We can make signifi cant headway in providing a practical and theoretical 
response to the ontological quandary facing contemporary legal theory if we 
reconsider the natural law tradition by connecting it to Perelman’s theory 
of argumentation in the three ways that I have described. Steven Smith’s 
incisive description of law’s quandary paralyzes the reader by off ering an 
either-or proposition: either “the Law” refers to something outside legal 
practice that can direct it, or it is just a nonsensical reference that exposes 
an ontological gap in which our discourse operates. Th ese unsatisfactory 
alternatives obscure the fact that the rhetorical appeal to “the Law” is not 
an appeal to something that exists outside the practice of law. By attending 
more carefully to legal practice we can explain and justify our references to 
“the Law” as part of the rhetorical elements of legal practice. Legal practice 
has historical and normative depth that always vastly exceeds any particular 
legal argument. 
 Consider the situation facing lawyers who are litigating a case of fi rst 
impression regarding enterprise liability for drug manufacturers when the 
maker of the drug that was ingested by the plaintiff  cannot be determined. 
Lawyers from both sides will argue strenuously that the law requires a ver-
dict in favor of their client, which means that there is an appeal to some-
thing beyond the equities attendant to the particular case before them. Th e 
“beyond,” however, just is the historical trajectory of the ongoing practice 
brought to bear on the case before the parties. Lawyers cannot generate a 
uniquely correct result for the case at hand by means of dialectical reason-
ing (despite the rhetorical conventions of legal argumentation that purport 
to accomplish this impossible feat), but in their appeals to the legal tradi-
tion they can generate plausible arguments for a rhetorical elaboration of 
what “the Law” requires in the case at hand. 
 In Perelman’s account, “the Law” is best conceptualized as a set of com-
monplaces from which one can draw in making an argument in a particular 
case and by which one invokes a universal audience that is competent to do 
justice (1980). Th e topoi that form “the Law” are real and provide guidance, 
even if they cannot resolve specifi c legal disputes defi nitively. Referring to 
“the Law” is just to make a general reference to the topoi from which one 
can argue for a specifi c result; consequently, “the Law” is neither empty nor 
a means of answering legal questions from the “outside.” 
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 We invoke “the Law” as a call for a response from the audience. Th e call 
asks the audience to respond by assuming the role of an idealized audience 
that is competent to do justice. Th e ubiquitous commonplaces of natural 
law argumentation in contemporary legal practice are not simply moves 
within the logic of doctrinal elaboration; rather, these commonplaces are 
focused on shaping the audience’s self-understanding. Natural law com-
monplaces serve an epideictic role as much as a forensic or logical role, and 
Perelman grasped the signifi cance of this role in his much misunderstood, 
and much maligned, notion of the universal audience. 
 Finally, the activity of appealing to “the Law” is a feature of our nature 
as hermeneutical and rhetorical beings, a nature that we can explore by 
pursuing a naturalized rhetoric. Perelman does not simply catalogue argu-
ments that may be deployed in rhetorical situations; he provides a window 
to human nature. Perelman is best read as pursuing a naturalized rhetoric, 
and from this understanding important implications for the natural law tra-
dition follow. By reading Perelman in this more radical manner we not only 
recognize the full scope of his ingenuity and originality but also make head-
way in one of the most important debates in political and legal philosophy. 
 Smith has argued that law is in a metaphysical quandary, separated from 
its natural law roots with no viable substitute to sustain legal legitimacy. 
With Perelman’s guidance, we fi nd a natural law solution to law’s quandary 
in the account off ered by contemporary rhetorical philosophy, even if it is 
very diff erent from the traditional natural law accounts that shape Smith’s 
anticipation of a suitable resolution of the quandary. Perelman’s theory of 
argumentation provides a way to resuscitate natural law theorizing while 
at the same time moving fi rmly beyond the false certainties that Perelman 
knew only impede our quest for justice. 
 William S. Boyd School of Law 
 University of Nevada, Las Vegas
notes 
 An earlier version of this article was presented at “Th e Promise of Reason,” convened at 
the University of Oregon in May 2008. I thank Jim Crosswhite, David Frank, and John 
Gage for putting together an excellent conference and for inviting me to attend. I extend 
special thanks to Jim Crosswhite for organizing this symposium and for providing such 
helpful feedback to me as I developed my talk into an article. I dedicate this article to 
Jan M. Broekman, dean emeritus of the Faculty of Law at the Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven, Belgium, and distinguished visiting professor at Penn State’s Dickinson School 
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of Law, in gratitude for a vibrant intellectual exchange whose mark extends well beyond 
this paper and for a warm, personal friendship. Professor Broekman does not necessarily 
endorse my theme—in fact, he remains quite skeptical about the utility of natural law—
nor is he to blame for the defi ciencies that remain in my argument. 
 1 .  I have reviewed Smith’s book in some detail elsewhere (Mootz 2008a). 
 2.  In his letter to the Romans, St. Paul writes: “For when Gentiles who do not have 
the Law do instinctively the things of the Law, these, not having the Law, are a law unto 
themselves, in that they show the work of the Law written in their hearts, their conscience 
bearing witness and their thoughts alternately accusing or else defending them, on the day 
when, according to my gospel, God will judge the secrets of men through Jesus Christ” 
( New American Standard Bible 1995, Romans 2:14–16). 
 3.  Robert George concedes that the truths of natural law often are obscured by socially 
constructed ideologies, as when southerners in the antebellum American South defended 
slavery (2007, 62). Hence, his conclusion: “So, if there is a set of moral norms, including 
norms of justice and human rights, that can be known by rational inquiry, understanding, 
and judgment even apart from any special revelation, then these norms of natural law can 
provide the basis for an international regime of human rights. Of course, we should not 
expect consensus” (2007, 64). 
 4 .  Burns challenges the conventional attribution to the sophists of radically relativist 
beliefs, concluding that “at least some of the sophists were not relativists but objectivists 
so far as questions of ethics are concerned” and that “the critical attitude of this group of 
thinkers towards the institution of slavery indicates the presence in fi fth-century Athens 
of a universalist, cosmopolitan, rationalist and humanitarian approach to questions of 
ethics and politics” (Burns 2003, 25, 26). Th e primary example is Alcidimas,
 who maintained that the institution of slavery contradicts rather than conforms 
to the principle of equity, which is the most fundamental principal of natural 
justice. Th is principle states that those who are equal ought to be treated equally 
in relevantly similar circumstances. Th e diff erence between Alcidimas and 
Aristotle is that Alcidimas took the view that all human beings  are by nature 
equal, and therefore that slavery is ethically unjustifi able, whereas Aristotle did 
not. (2002, 550) 
 5 .  Naturalizing rhetoric does not rest on theological commitments, but neither is it 
necessarily at odds with religious belief. John Macquarrie contends that a viable account 
of natural law can serve as a bridge between faith and morality if it “takes account of the 
change and development which . . . are characteristic not only of man’s images of himself 
but of his very nature and of the world around him” (1991, 232). Macquarrie explains:
 But if we acknowledge . . . that man’s nature is open, and that he is always 
going beyond or transcending any given state of himself; and if we acknowledge 
further that this open nature of man is set in the midst of a cosmos which is 
likewise on the move and is characterized by an evolving rather than a static 
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order; then we must say that the natural law itself, not just its formulations, is 
on the move and cannot have the immutability once ascribed to it. But what has 
perhaps more than anything else discredited the natural law concept is the tacit 
assumption that there was a kind of original human nature to which everything 
subsequent is an accretion. . . . Man’s very nature is to exist, that is to say, to go 
out of himself, and in the course of this he learns to take over from crude nature 
and to do in a human (and humane) way what was once accomplished by blind 
natural forces (both in man and outside of him) working in a rough and ready 
manner. (1991, 241) 
 My notion of a naturalized rhetoric would be one manner of dealing with the dynamic 
reality of man’s nature and could be accommodated to religious belief, as Macquarrie sug-
gests, without being dependent on any such belief. 
 6.  Richard Epstein (2005) has argued that we ought to infl ate Hart’s “natural neces-
sity” to a more robust, yet still libertarian, notion of human welfare. In response, James 
Allan (2007) argues that it is a mistake to expand Hart’s minimalist approach. 
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